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Abstract 
The beams in the LHC can be intercepted by many 
different types of objects moving into the vacuum 
chambers.  These include devices designed for beam 
monitoring, machine protection and for data taking by the 
experiments.   Moving these objects can only be 
permitted under certain conditions.  Interlocks should 
prevent quenches or even damage in case of wrong 
actions.   A complete inventory of such devices will be 
given along with the conditions under which they can be 
moved and the interlocks, or signals, that are required to 
ensure that they cannot be activated at other times.   A 
particular issue concerns the optics imperfections which 
can change significantly the safe position settings for a 
given mobile device.   Controlling the orbit and beta-
beating errors is therefore an important pre-requisite to 
commissioning protection devices and the collimation 
system. 
INTRODUCTION  
Many objects to be installed in the LHC ring and 
transfer lines will be capable of moving into the beam 
aperture.  Under the right conditions this should pose no 
problem to the machine.  For some objects this implies 
that there is no beam in the machine when the element 
moves into the aperture.  Interlocks must be used to 
protect both the equipment itself and the machine when 
activation of mobile devices occurs under the wrong 
machine conditions.    Such interlocks must safely remove 
the beam from the LHC before it can pose any danger to 
either element, or the machine.  
In addition to interlocks – which provide protection – 
vetos should also be provided to avoid unnecessary down 
time for the accelerator.   A veto can be used to prevent 
an element being moved if the safe conditions are not 
met.   This approach would avoid the interlock firing and 
the beam being removed.  
Two major types of elements will be present in the 
LHC: IN/OUT and Mobile devices.   In this paper an 
inventory of all such devices is made with the conditions 
under which they may and may not be used.   
IN/OUT DEVICES IN THE TRANSFER 
LINES  
The conditions in the transfer lines are somewhat 
relaxed with respect to the ring since circulating beam is 
not present and only single pass events can occur.  Even 
so, the full SPS batch delivered to the LHC is dangerous 
and suitable steps must be taken to avoid extraction of the 
beam if any element is wrongly positioned.  In this case 
the interlocks must be connected to the SPS interlock 
system, not the LHC.  
Stoppers & Dumps 
In each of the LHC transfer lines there are 2 beam 
dumps (TED), one at the upstream and one at the 
downstream end of the line.  In the case of TI 8 an 
additional safety stopper (TBSE) is installed.  The normal 
operating mode for these elements is either OUT – to 
allow beam to pass, or IN to obstruct the beam passage 
completely.  They are therefore built to withstand a full 
SPS batch to the LHC.   In the case of the TED the beam 
can be repeatedly fired onto it.  The TBSE should never 
see beam since it is one of the access safety elements for 
the transfer line.  It can, however, mechanically withstand 
the occasional impact of a full SPS batch.    
These elements take some time to move from OUT to 
IN and visa versa.  In the case of the TED, the movement 
takes up to 82 seconds.   During this ‘MOVING’ period 
extraction inhibits must be provided to prevent beam 
passing through a reduced aperture.   In the past the TED 
in the extraction lines of the SPS have been provided with 
a software interlock to prevent such an occurrence. 
Screens 
Each transfer line has 9 screen mechanisms installed.  
These are in addition to those installed in the extraction 
channels of the SPS and the initial part of the transfer 
lines (TT40 and TT60).  These screens will be used to 
measure the transverse profile of the beam.  Several 
screens together can be used to extract information on the 
optics in the line.   
As with the TED, the screen mechanisms can be IN, 
OUT, or MOVING.  The same arguments to providing an 
extraction inhibit during screen movement apply.  
However, for the case where the screen is in the beamline, 
additional constraints apply. 
Each mechanism is provided with two different screens. 
The OTR screen is very thin and can withstand a full SPS 
batch.  The Aluminium screens cannot.   In the case 
where Al screens are in use an intensity limit must be 
applied before allowing the extraction.  In addition, the 
use of several screens (of either type) could produce 
significant blow-up of the beam.  In this case safe 
injection into the LHC is more difficult.   A cross 
interlock is therefore required.  Hence, above certain 
intensities, the screens cannot be used if the beam is to be 
injected into the LHC.   This might require the kickers to 
be cut or, more likely, the downstream TED to be in the 
beam.  
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Vacuum Valves 
Each transfer line has a total of 7 vacuum valves for 
sectorisation of the vacuum system.  These valves are 
activated by compressed air, but mechanically locked into 
the open or closed position.   This means that failure of 
the compressed air supply will not cause the valves to 
close.  Each valve has end switches for the open and 
closed position.  These are connected in series to the 
valve interlock chain.   As soon as a valve leaves the open 
position, the chain is broken and an extraction inhibit is 
generated.   More details of valve operation are given in 
the next section.  
IN/OUT RING DEVICES 
Several different types of devices are installed in the 
LHC rings including vacuum valves, stoppers and a 
variety of beam instruments: screens, mirrors and wire 
scanners.   Some of the beam instruments can be used 
with circulating beam in the machine, albeit with 
restrictions.  In all other cases the movement of an 
element must result in the activation of an interlock 
leading to an immediate beam abort.  
Vacuum Valves (Normal)  
The behaviour of the normal vacuum valves has already 
been described in the previous section.   A ring interlock 
is provided which connects all vacuum valves in the LHC 
rings to the beam interlock controllers.  A total of 249 
vacuum valves are installed in the LHC [1].  This 
corresponds to 110 valves per ring and 29 valves common 
to both rings.  
In the case where the valve control system detects a 
pressure rise the surrounding valves will be closed.  
However, before sending the command to close the valves 
a request to fire the beam dump will be made.  The 
vacuum control system will then wait for an OK status 
from the beam dump before beginning the valve closing 
procedure.  Once initiated, the valve takes around 
3 seconds to completely close.   Since moving the valve 
also breaks the valve interlock chain, a redundant 
interlock is therefore provided to reduce the chance of the 
valve closing onto a circulating beam.  
Since any manipulation of the valves will provoke an 
immediate beam abort, a veto on such actions in the 
presence of circulating beam is suggested.  This would 
have to make use of a measurement of the beam intensity 
distributed around the machine.  Such information should 
form part of the safe beam parameters of the machine 
protection system [2].  
Vacuum Valves (Fast) 
A recent engineering specification [3] has described 
two fast acting vacuum valves to be installed around 
LHCb (point 8).  These would be different from the 
normal valves in two fundamental ways: 
• In case of a vacuum pressure rise the valve will 
immediately begin to close, instead of issuing a 
request to the beam dump and waiting for the OK 
status back.   However, a trigger to the beam 
interlock system will occur once the valve begins 
to close. 
• Once triggered, the complete closure time for the 
valve is 13ms (or ~150 turns) 
These valves represent a very real danger for the 
machine since a redundant request for the beam abort is 
not provided.   Such a redundant request is very difficult 
to achieve by other means.   As it closes the aperture the 
valve edge is moving at approximately 1 beam sigma per 
turn.  If the beam dump trigger fails to generate a beam 
abort then the first indication of problems would occur 
once the edge of the valve begins to intercept the beam at, 
say, 8 σ.  A complete catastrophic loss of the total beam 
would then occur over the following ~10 turns.  This 
would produce significant damage around the machine as 
well as the complete destruction of the valve itself.   Very 
little reaction time is available for beam loss monitors and 
the like.   A careful study of these devices and the means 
to redundantly protect the machine from them is needed 
before they are installed in the machine.  
Vacuum Valves (Passive) 
Two passive valves will be installed around the Alice 
detector.  These valves can only be opened, or closed, 
manually.  However, complete remote status information 
is provided.  These valves are also attached to the vacuum 
valve interlock chain.  
RF Stoppers and Safety Stoppers 
Four RF electron stoppers will be installed in IR4.  
These will be used during RF conditioning (NO BEAM) 
to protect people accessing the adjacent regions of the 
machine.  At the time of writing the plan is to install 2 
safety stoppers in the machine at IR6.  These so-called 
‘sacrificial blocks’ are required by the LHC access safety 
system [4].   It is possible that the required functionality 
will be combined with that of the RF stopper, thus 
negating the need for a special installation in point 6.  
The RF electron stoppers and safety stoppers will make 
use of standard valve mechanisms and their interlock 
behaviour will be similar.  However, since they are also 
surveyed by the LASS, it will not be possible to re-open 
them if the access and safety conditions do not permit.    
Injection and Matching Screens 
Five screens are provided for each injection channel of 
the LHC.  These are placed around the septa, kickers and 
TDI in point 2 and point 6.  In addition 2 matching 
monitors are installed in point 4 (one per ring).  An 
additional matching monitor is installed in point 3 for 
beam 2.  The total is therefore 13 mechanisms.   Each is 
provided with an OTR screen.  Most of the injection 
screens will see the beam only on a single pass.  The 
others, together with the matching monitors are designed 
to observe the beam over multiple turns.   In all cases, 
their use is incompatible with a circulating beam.  
Moving one of these screens in should provoke an 
immediate beam abort. 
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Intensity limits exist for the matching monitors.  The 
limit is based on the total intensity and the number of 
turns.  The following hardware limits have been noted 
[5]: 
300 turns with 1x10+11 protons 
    2 turns with 3x10+13 protons 
A veto/interlock must therefore be provided based on 
these limits.   It should be noted that the information on 
the intensity must be read from the SPS and that the veto 
should take the form of an extraction inhibit in the SPS.   
Wire Scanners 
Four wire scanners will be installed in the LHC (1 per 
plane and per ring).  These can be used with circulating 
beam with the following limits on the total intensity [5]: 
450 GeV: 8x72 nominal bunches:  6.62x10+13 
    7 TeV: 2x72 nominal bunches: 1.66x10+13 
It should be noted that the above limits refer to the 
hardware itself.   There is no guarantee that the use of the 
wire scanners with such intensities will not provoke a 
quench in the machine.  
Alignment Mirrors 
Each ring will have a BEUV telescope.   An alignment 
mirror forms part of each mechanism.  This must be 
dropped into the beam aperture in order to perform the 
fine alignment of the optics.   A veto is required to 
prevent the mirror being put in with circulating beam.   In 
addition an interlock is desirable to prevent beam being 
re-injected with the mirror in place.   
IN/OUT DEVICES IN THE DUMP LINES 
  The devices in the dump lines are slightly special 
since they are within the beam dump system itself.  This 
imposes slightly different conditions on the interlocks and 
vetos associated with them.   
Vacuum Valves 
Each beam dump line contains 2 vacuum valves.  The 
behaviour of these is identical to that described earlier.  It 
should be clear that even though the valve will not 
intercept the circulating beam, a beam abort must be 
issued if one of these valves begins to close.   Since the 
valves act rather slowly and the beam abort request is 
issues immediately a trigger is received, there should be 
no problem extracting the beam past the closing valve.  
Screens 
Three screens are provided for each beam dump line.  
The positions are: 
• Upstream of the extraction septum 
• Immediately downstream of the dilution kickers 
• In front of the beam dump block. 
These screens are used to adjust the settings of the 
extraction equipment: the first screen for the MKD, the 
second for the MSD and the last for the MKB. As such, it 
must be possible to have the screens in with beam.  The 
final screen is permanently in place.  However, the first 
two can be retracted.  Since the beam hitting these screens 
is not yet diluted by the sweep of the MKB, they cannot 
stand full nominal intensities at top energy.  The 
following is therefore required: 
• A veto on moving the screens in with the 
intensity/energy combination over a certain limit 
(roughly half nominal intensity at 7 TeV). 
• An inhibit preventing the acceleration of the beams if 
the intensity is above the limit mentioned in the 
previous bullet.  
It should be noted that, while the screens are actually 
moving, a beam abort would not be completely clean.  In 
the worst case some beam would be scattered from the 
frame of the screen and could cause damage or activation 
in the downstream elements.  A study is needed to 
determine if the screen movement can be allowed with 
circulating beam in the LHC. 
MOBILE DEVICES 
Collimation and Protection 
In phase 1 of the collimation system a total of 108 
collimators and protection elements will be installed in 
the LHC and transfer lines.  The numbers are split as 
follows: 
• Collimation System (including absorbers): 78 
• Aperture Protection (for dump problems):   4 
• Protection elements for injection:      6 
• Transfer line collimators:   14 
• Other elements (scrapers):     6 
The above numbers refer only to fully mobile devices.  
Many additional fixed blocks and passive absorber 
elements will also be present around the machine.  
The majority of the collimator and protection elements 
have two jaws and two motors per jaw.  Each will have a 
maximum and minimum position and end stop switches 
to protect the equipment.  
In the case of a motor failure, the collimators and 
protection elements will react differently.  For the 
collimators, the affected will retract and a beam dump 
request issued.   The idea here is to avoid leaving an 
object stuck in the aperture of the machine.  Depending 
on the importance of the affected collimator, operation 
may continue, or be stopped for repair.   
For the protection elements the opposite is true.   In 
case of motor failure here the element must remain in 
position – since retracting it would leave the machine 
unprotected.  In this case, it is not necessary to issue an 
immediate beam dump since the conditions for the 
machine are still perfectly safe.  A warning, however, 
would have to be issued.   Beam operation would have to 
be suspended only when movement of the device is 
required to maintain the required level protection.   
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Examples of this might be the retraction of the injection 
elements before acceleration, or the movement of the 
TCDQ to protect the cold aperture during the squeeze. 
Failure to move as requested therefore would have to 
result in an immediate beam abort. 
Other Mobile Devices 
Several experimental detectors are planned that will 
move close to the beam during stable data taking periods.  
These include: 
• Totem Roman Pots:   24 initially (eventually 36) 
• Atlas Roman Pots:     8 
• LHCb Velo:               1 Detector (2 jaws) 
• Alice ZDC: 2 Detectors not in the machine 
vacuum. 
• BBLR :  Not baseline, but eventually 8 
wires.  
In terms of aperture the Totem Roman Pots are the 
most critical.  The plan is to run them during stable beam 
periods with settings at around 10σ from the beam axis. 
This places them rather close to the aperture protected by 
the collimators.   Their position must therefore be well 
known and carefully controlled, since relatively small 
position errors could lead to the roman pots becoming the 
primary aperture of the machine.  An issue for the 
experimental detectors concerns who and from where the 
control will be exercised.    In fact, regardless of this the 
interaction between the LHC machine protection elements 
and these devices must be very strong.  In addition, a 
detailed knowledge of the state of the LHC is needed 
before permission can be granted to move these devices.   
Conditions for Moving Mobile Devices 
The collimators are principally in place to provide the 
necessary level of beam cleaning in order to avoid 
quenches of the cold magnets.  They play the additional 
role of providing some protection in the case of abnormal 
operation.  Additional protection elements are provided to 
fill the protection holes left by the collimators.  In order to 
function correctly all these elements must be carefully 
positioned with respect to each other around the beam.  
An example of the required settings for 450 GeV is given 
in Tab. 1. 
Table 1: Collimator and Protection Element Settings for 
450 GeV Injection Conditions 
aabs 10 σ Active Absorbers 
asec3 9.3 σ IR3 Secondary Collimators 
aprim3 8.0 σ IR3 Primary Collimators 
aring 7.5 σ Ring Cold Aperture 
aprot 6.8-7.0 σ Protection Elements 
asec 6.7 σ IR7 Secondary Collimators 
aprim 5.7 σ IR7 Primary Collimators 
aTL 4.5 σ Transfer Line Collimators 
(ring Protection at 6.9 σ) 
The positions of each collimator computed from such a 
list forms a coherent set, or file, of settings.   May datasets 
of this type can exist.  In addition, different sets will be 
required at different points in the operational cycle of the 
machine; notably injection, acceleration, squeeze and 
physics.  
Although the positions are known and can be set 
precisely, some room for optimization will be required.  It 
is useful to think in terms of a window for moving each 
element around the position given in the file.  Such 
optimization will be needed on a regular basis to take into 
account minor variations in the beam parameters, or 
settings.  It should be noted that the change of any 
position must be done knowing the position of all other 
elements.   The functionality of each element must always 
be maintained.   The optimization window itself must 
vary as a function of the mode of the machine.   In 
general the window will shrink as the intensity and energy 
go up and the β* goes down.   During stable data taking, 
essentially no freedom for optimization can exist.  
The parameter space governing what can and cannot be 
moved is therefore rather complex.   It is highly desirable 
that the control of all mobile elements is done from a 
single location – preferably using a single application.  
The Effect of Optical Errors 
Converting the sigma of Tab. 1 into millimetre 
positions at each element will initially be done based on 
the theoretical β at each location.  In fact beta-beating can 
modify significantly the beam size at a given location.  
Beta-beating therefore imposes a strong limitation on the 
collimation and protection systems (more properly the 
collimation and protection systems impose a strong 
limitation on the tolerable amount of beta-beating).  Two 
types of beta-beating can occur: 
Static Beta-beating 
This is not too much of a problem, up to a certain point.  
The collimator positions can be adjusted based on 
measured beta values rather than the theoretical ones.  
However as the amount of beta-beating increases the 
aperture of the machine is reduced as the beam size 
changes in the cold parts of the machine.  This implies 
increasingly tight protection settings to avoid the cold 
machine becoming the aperture limit.   
Transient or Dynamic Beta-beating 
This occurs during acceleration (especially snapback) 
and squeezing and is a result of dynamic errors in the 
magnetic machine.  With values above about 10% there is 
a strong risk of loosing functionality in the system (such 
as the secondary collimators becoming the primaries).  
With significant orbit offsets the problem is even worse.  
Transient beta-beating will severely limit the intensity and 
the ability to optimize the collimators until it is under 
control.   
Machine Modes 
Where the machine is within its operational cycle is an 
important constraint on the behaviour governing the 
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movement of mobile devices.  Certain elements are active 
only in a specific mode of the machine – such as 
injection, or stable data taking.  Others must move as the 
mode changes.   At present the different machine modes 
are not completely defined.  However, the LHC modes 
are likely to be similar to those used for LEP and these 
can be used as a guideline.  For this analysis the following 
modes are of significance: 
• Setup :   Injection optimization 
• Injection : Accumulation of the physics intensities 
• Acceleration 
• Squeeze  
• Physics: Stable data taking. 
Setup 
Before first injection the collimators and protection 
elements must be put into the positions determined during 
previous runs.  All other objects must be moved out of the 
way.  With a setup beam of low or intermediate intensity, 
the individual positions of the collimator and protection 
elements may be optimized. This may involve optimizing 
beam loss monitor signals, or repositioning the beam 
around measured beam profiles.   The optimized positions 
must still comply with the functionality of each element. 
Injection 
During the process of injecting the main beam the 
chosen positions will probably be fixed – or at least the 
movement for optimization restricted.  Once the injection 
process is complete, injection must be inhibited at the 
level of the SPS extraction and the injection protection 
elements moved out. 
Acceleration/Squeeze 
Whether the collimators need to move during 
acceleration is presently under discussion.  This might be 
desirable to follow the shrinking beam size – especially 
with protection elements such as the TCDQ.  The early 
part of the ramp, during snapback, is one of the most 
difficult periods since the available aperture is quite small 
and the level of transient beta-beating may be rather high.  
During the squeeze the aperture limitation in the LHC 
moves from the cold arc magnets to the inner triplet.  
Before the squeeze the cold aperture is at several 10’s of 
sigma.  At the end it is in the inner triplet at 8.4σ.  To 
protect the inner triplet the collimators and protection 
devices must move in, either before or progressively 
during, the squeeze.  Once again a window for adjustment 
around the optimum theoretical settings must be given.   
Physics 
It is necessary to distinguish between data-taking and 
non data-taking periods.  Before stable physics begins it 
may be necessary to move the collimators once again - for 
optimization of background or increased cleaning 
efficiency.   From this point onwards the allowed range 
for collimator position optimization must be very small.   
Once stable physics conditions are declared the 
experimental detectors can be moved into their data-
taking positions.  Each detector will need a small 
tolerance in the position to allow for fill-to-fill variations. 
If, for any reason, the machine drops out of stable physics 
mode, these detectors must be automatically moved out of 
the beam aperture.  This might occur if the beam stability 
or lifetime drops and re-optimization of the machine 
parameters are required.  
 In this case there is a very strong link between the 
mode of the machine and the machine protection.   
SUMMARY 
A summary of all devices in the LHC capable of 
moving into the beam aperture is given in Tab. 2.  A total 
of 476 objects are described.  Over half are vacuum 
valves.  In most cases the basic interlocks governing the 
object moving into the beam aperture is covered in the 
hardware design.  Some objects need more special 
treatment – especially those that are designed to intercept 
the beams under certain circumstances.   
The control of mobile devices which are meant to be 
moved close to the beam needs special attention.  The 
settings of these devices will depend heavily on the mode 
of the machine together with the intensity and energy of 
the beams. The settings of all elements form a coherent 
set and the functionality of each object must be 
maintained under all conditions.  Failure to do this might 
result in an object becoming the primary aperture in the 
machine, or the machine loosing its protecting aperture 
limits.   Since no object can be moved in isolation,  It is 
therefore recommended that the control of all mobile 
elements in the LHC is exercised by the same applications 
in the same control room. 
The proposed fast acting vacuum valves around LHCb 
are of particular concern.  A single level of protection is 
provided in the form of an end switch trigger.  This will 
fire the beam abort if the valve begins to close.  If, for any 
reason, the beam is not dumped immediately, a 
catastrophic loss of the beam on the valves will occur.  
More studies are needed to determine if an additional 
redundant means of ensuring the machine protection 
exists.  
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Table 2: Inventory of Objects in the LHC and Transfer Lines 
Name Description No. Position Type Comment 
TED Stopper 4 TI8/TI2 IN/OUT Needs extraction interlock while moving 
TBSE Safety Stopper 1 TI8 IN/OUT Needs extraction interlock while moving 
BTV Screens 18 TI8/TI2 IN/OUT Limitation on extraction intensity with Al screen. 
Needs extraction interlock while moving 
VV TL Vacuum Valves 14 TI8/TI2 IN/OUT  
TCDI TL Collimators 14 TI8/TI2 Mobile  
VV Ring Vacuum Valves 249  IN/OUT Veto activation with circulating beam 
VVX Fast Valves 2 IR8 IN/OUT Very fast acting 
VVX Passive Valves 2 IR2 IN/OUT Mechanical action only.  Remote Status available 
BTV Injection & Matching Screens 13 IR2/IR8/ 
IR3/IR4 
IN/OUT Veto movement with circulating beam 
Limit on the number of turns vs. injected intensity 
BWS Wire Scanners 4 IR4 IN/OUT Limits on intensity vs. energy 
 RF Electron Stoppers 4 IR4 IN/OUT Linked to LHC Access Safety System 
 Safety Stoppers 2 IR6 IN/OUT Linked to LHC Access Safety System 
BEUV Alignment Mirrors 2 IR4 IN/OUT  
VV Dump line Vacuum Valves 4 IR6 IN/OUT Dump Circulating beam on activation 
BTV Dump Line Screens 6 IR6 IN/OUT Veto movement with intensity above a threshold 
Veto acceleration with screens in above threshold 
TCP Primary Collimators 8 IR3/IR7 Mobile  
TCSG Secondary Collimators 30 IR3/IR7 Mobile  
TCT Tertiary Collimators 16 IR1/IR5/IR2 Mobile  
TCLP Absorbers 8 IR1/IR5 Mobile Absorbers for Physics regions 
TCLA Absorbers 16 IR3/IR7 Mobile Cleaning region absorbers 
TCSP Scrapers 6 IR3/IR7 Mobile For special use. 
TCDQ Protection Elements 2 IR6 Mobile Protect cold aperture from bad dump. 
TCS Protection Elements 2 IR6 Mobile As above 
TDI Injection Protection 2 IR2/IR8 Mobile  
TCLI Injection Protection 4 IR2/IR8 Mobile  
XRP Totem Roman Pots 24 IR5 Mobile Set at 10s in during stable data taking 
XRP Atlas Roman Pots 8 IR1 Mobile  
VELO LHCb Vertex Locator 1 IR8 Mobile At around 5mm from beam axis during data taking 
ZDC Alice Detectors 2 IR2 Mobile Outside the beam vacuum. 
BBLR Beam-Beam Compensator 8 IR1/IR5 Mobile Not baseline 
Total    476 
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